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ABSTRACT 
 
Batool Zaidi: In the Pursuit of Sons: Sex-Selective Abortion and Differential Stopping in Pakistan 
(Under the direction of S. Philip Morgan) 
 
Even though Pakistan is a highly patriarchal society, it has not featured prominently in 
studies focusing on son preference and sex ratios at birth. But with fertility declining and given 
strong son preference (Pakistan has one of the highest desired sex ratios in the world), how will 
Pakistani families respond? Using data for 2006-07, I show clear evidence of both sex selection 
practice and differential stopping behavior. An earlier survey (1990-91) shows only modest 
evidence of differential stopping behavior. The comparison of the two survey rounds also 
supports the increasing role of son preference in fertility behavior in Pakistan. With increasing 
access to contraceptive and sex selection technology, both differential stopping and sex 
selection are likely to continue increasing for some time. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Given Pakistan’s geo-political importance, the future of its population is of great interest 
to academics as well as policymakers. Even if Pakistan’s fertility continues to decline and 
reaches replacement level in the next 30 years, its population will have increased by a 100 
million to around 275 million. This growth will make it the fifth most populous nation in the 
world (United Nations [UN], Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
2011). If son preference continues to be a strong determinant of fertility behavior, fertility 
levels will be increased by the pursuit of a male birth, making it harder for Pakistan to reach 
replacement fertility. Alternatively, if couples respond by using sex-selective abortion, Pakistan 
will experience skewed sex ratios possibly leading to additional social problems. A continuingly 
low contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) of 35 percent (National Institute of Population Studies 
[NIPS] and Macro International 2013) and an elevated sex ratio at birth (SRB) (Guilmoto 2009) 
suggest both scenarios are unfolding. 
Son preference in a highly patriarchal society like Pakistan is not surprising. My focus is 
on how the son preference is changing (or persisting) in the face of the current socioeconomic 
and demographic changes popularly viewed as development and/or modernization. Analyzing 
changes in demographic factors (such as fertility behavior) can provide clues to changes in 
institutionalized gender stratification that are less influenced by normative response bias 
(Pollard and Morgan 2002). Studying changes in son preference (operationalized through the 
propensity to continue childbearing given the gender composition of previous children) 
presents an opportunity to better understand theories linking gender norms and processes of 
modernization to demographic transition theories. 
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This paper aims to address the following questions: what is the pattern and strength of 
son preference in Pakistan over time, i.e. since the beginning of the fertility transition? Is this 
preference for sons leading to higher fertility through differential stopping behavior or to 
skewed sex ratios through sex selective abortions? Or both?
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CHAPTER 2: THE FERTILITY TRANSITION AND SEX PREFERENCE 
The link between fertility and son preference changes over the course of the 
demographic transition. At the beginning of the transition when fertility control is low and 
women are having a large number of children, son preference is not a strong determinant of 
fertility behavior, even in patriarchal societies. As contraceptive technology becomes widely 
available and fertility starts declining, the preference for sons becomes an increasingly central 
factor in couples’ fertility decisions in such societies. This has been referred to by some as the 
“intensification effect” of fertility decline on gender bias – when the fertility starts to decline 
“the total number of children couples desire falls more rapidly than the total number of desired 
sons” (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997). Bongaarts’ (2013) paper shows the changing relationship 
between the fertility transition and the desire and observed preference for sons (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Expected patterns of sex ratios over the course of the transition in son 
preference 
 
Source: Bongaarts 2013
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At higher parities, the probability of having at least one son is very high (Dyson 2012). 
However, as family size gets smaller, the probability of having a son gets smaller. When the 
average family size is six children, the probability of being sonless is one percent. However, 
when the average family size falls to three children, the probability of being sonless increases 
to 12 percent (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). The probability of being sonless doubles with every 
one child reduction in the average family size (Guilmoto 2009). In other words, in order to 
ensure at least one son, women would need to have 1.94 births on average, and in order to have 
at least two sons, they would need to have 4.38 births on average (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). 
Guilmoto (2009) argues that as low fertility norms set deeper into society the marginal costs of 
additional children become increasingly untenable. In order to ensure both size and 
compositional goals couples resort to sex-selective abortion.  
Higher than normal sex ratios at birth are “unambiguous evidence” that couples are 
practicing sex-selective abortions (Bongaarts 2013). Note that differential stopping behavior – 
when women stop childbearing through contraceptive use if they have achieved the desired 
number of sons or continue childbearing till they have the desired number of sons– does not 
translate to skewed sex ratios at birth. This is because the probability of having a son or 
daughter remains largely fixed, regardless of parity.1In contrast, sex-selective abortion alters 
the number of boys being born, thus producing skewed sex ratios at birth.  
Over the last decade and half skewed sex ratios at birth have been reported in several 
Asian countries. Much of the research on sex ratio imbalances focused on South Korea, India 
and China where national sex ratios at birth deviated from normal levels of 106 to as high as 
115, 119, and 110, respectively, (Hesketh and Xing 2006). Since then, elevated sex ratios have 
been reported in other Asian countries including Vietnam (Guilmoto 2012), Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia, and Albania (Duthé et al. 2012). All countries experiencing elevated sex ratios 
at birth have low fertility and abortion technology widely available.  
                                                
1There is evidence of a slight dependence of sex of birth to sex composition of previous births – this is 
discussed in greater detail in the Methods and Measures chapter.  
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Even though Pakistan continues to be a highly patriarchal society, it has not featured 
prominently in studies focusing on son preference and sex ratios at birth because, until 
recently, fertility rates (including wanted fertility) remained high and abortions were believed to 
be rare due to the absence of legal abortion services. In the following paragraphs, I demonstrate 
how women in Pakistan are ready, willing, and able to practice sex selection.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE PAKISTANI EXPERIENCE 
3.1 Fertility Squeeze 
While most of its neighboring countries began experiencing fertility decline before the 
1980s, fertility rates in Pakistan remained above six births per woman until the late 1980s/early 
1990s. It is widely accepted that the fertility transition in Pakistan began at this point (Sathar 
and Casterline 1998). Despite a significant drop after the onset, overall fertility in Pakistan 
declined slowly throughout the 1990s, and reached 4.8 births per woman by 2000–01.  
Given the high number of children women were having, it is not surprising that son-
preference did not translate into high sex ratios at birth (Hesketh and Xing 2006) during this 
time period. In the last decade however, Pakistan’s total fertility rate (TFR) has declined further 
and is estimated to be around 3.8 births per woman, and is as low as 3.2 in urban areas (NIPS 
and Macro International 2013). Women in Pakistan are now facing the fertility squeeze that 
makes achieving sex preferences difficult without preferential behavior.  
3.2 Son Preference 
Despite modest improvements, gender inequality and the preferential treatment of sons 
is still ubiquitous in Pakistani society. Gender differentials in children’s health and education 
outcomes are lessening, but remain stark. Nearly twice as many young women (15–24) never 
attend school as young men, enrollment rates at both primary and secondary levels are lower 
for girls, and girls drop out of school at a higher rate than boys (Zaidi et al. 2012). Boys have 
better health outcomes as well; child mortality is lower for boys than girls and the most 
common causes of under-five deaths for boys are related to neonatal complication, while they 
are infectious disease related for girls. Preferential treatment for boys begins before birth. 
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Using data from the Pakistan Demographic Health Survey (PDHS), Bharadwaj and Lakdawala 
(2013) find that women are more likely to get prenatal checkups and take iron pills when 
pregnant with a boy. The magnitude of discrimination is larger in areas with more son 
preference. 
It is not surprising then, that of 61 countries, Pakistan has the second highest desired 
sex ratio at birth (DSRB), a measure of the preference for sons calculated using reported ideal 
number of male and female offspring by couples in Demographic and Health Surveys 
(Bongaarts 2013).  
3.3 Availability of Technology 
For the high DSRB to translate into high SRB, couples need to have the means to identify 
the sex of a fetus and have access to abortion services (Bongaarts 2013). Contrary to 
expectations, abortion rates in Pakistan are unexpectedly high for an Islamic country that 
forbids abortion under all, but extreme circumstances. A national study found abortion rates in 
Pakistan to be much higher than expected; an estimated 890,000 abortions took place in 2002 –
amounting to 29 abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age (Sathar, Singh, and Fikree 
2007). According to a study of women hospitalized for post-abortion complications, 20 percent 
of women who had an abortion had 0–2 children, and another 30 percent had 3–4 children 
(Vlassoff, Singh, and Suarez 2009). Given that the ideal family size was close to four children, it 
is likely that not all of these abortions were for limiting family size.  
The 2007 PDHS shows that ultrasound technology is widely available in urban and rural 
areas – 66 percent of women had an ultrasound check during antenatal checkup for their last 
pregnancy (NIPS and Macro International 2008). These findings indicate both the availability of 
services and women’s willingness to seek abortions despite cultural taboos – a trend that is 
likely to have increased over the last decade. 
The trends discussed above indicate that all the prerequisites for sex-selective practice 
are in place. Family size is getting smaller, abortions are taking place albeit illegally and 
unsafely, and the preferential treatment of boys remains prevalent. However, these 
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prerequisites do not guarantee sex-selective abortions; it is possible that Pakistani women may 
be differentially choosing to continue childbearing in order to achieve compositional goals. 
According to Bongaarts’ study (2013), Pakistan also had the fifth highest sex ratio at last 
birth (SRLB). A high SRLB is a very sensitive indicator of differential stopping behavior, and can 
be explained entirely by differential contraceptive use. The CPR increased rapidly from around 
11 percent in 1991 to 33 percent by 2003. But by 2007, it had not increased further and had in 
fact declined slightly to 29 percent. The latest round of the DHS (2012–13) reports a CPR of 35 
percent. Stalling CPRs and the consequent slowdown of fertility decline indicate that women 
may be continuing childbearing in the pursuit of sons. 
As fertility continues to fall and women get closer to achieving their desired family size 
but son preference remains pervasive, the role of compositional goals in fertility decisions is 
expected to continue to increase. So in the face of persistent son preference, but changing 
family size norms, are Pakistani women ignoring cultural pressures and compositional goals, 
having more children, or getting an abortion to meet both size and compositional fertility goals 
(Figure 2)?  
Figure 2: Possible responses to conflicting pressures of smaller family size and 
bearing a male offspring 
  
 
Son Preference Smaller Family Size   
Additional births till son Change sex preference Sex selective abortion 
Skewed sex-ratios at 
birth 
Slow down in fertility 
decline 
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In understanding fertility change, Davis and Blake (1956) argue that people choose those 
means of change that involve the least institutional organization and reorganization. Given that 
patriarchy is deeply entrenched in Pakistani society and institutions, I hypothesize that in the 
relative short term, women will respond by either continuing to have additional births until 
they have the desired number of sons, or they will resort to prenatal sex selection to ensure the 
desired number at lower parities.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA 
In the absence of recent census data, I study these questions by using data from two 
rounds (1990–91 and 2006–07) of the PDHS. Data from demographic and health surveys has 
been used in several international research studies on son preference and prenatal sex selection 
(Arnold, Kishor, and Roy 2002; Ebenstein 2007; Garenne 2008; Bongaarts 2013).  
The demographic and health surveys collect data on the reproductive history, behavior, 
and intentions for women of reproductive age (15–49). The PDHS sample for 1990–91 
comprised of 6,611 ever-married women (15–49) and their birth history data for 27,369 births2. 
The 2006–07 sample was larger, containing information on 10,032 ever-married women (15–49) 
and all their births (39,049). 
The birth history data provide the gender and birth order of each birth allowing for the 
estimation of parity progression ratios by gender composition of previous births. The data on 
intentions allow for a more prospective analysis of the relationship between son-preference and 
fertility. The detailed background indicators collected in the PDHS provide an opportunity to 
study these patterns across various population subgroups. And importantly, the two rounds of 
the survey allow for a comparison of these measures over the time Pakistan has experienced 
the fertility transition.3 
                                                
2The 1990–91 DHS data was argued to have severely underestimated fertility rates (Juarez and Sathar 
2001). The re-interview survey conducted to check data reliability did find evidence of underreporting of 
births, but none for sex differentials in consistency of reporting (Curtis and Arnold 1994). These problems 
suggest caution in interpreting the 1990–91 results but do not suggest a particular bias in key results 
presented here. 
 
3Fieldwork for another round of the PDHS has reached completion and findings/data will be made 
available by December 2013. The analysis done on the 1990–91 and 2006–07 data will be replicated for 
this upcoming round, as soon as the data is accessible. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS AND MEASURES 
The bulk of the analysis in the paper is based on the sex of a child being a random event 
with relatively fixed probabilities of being a boy (0.512) or a girl (0.488)4. I use Bongaarts and 
Potter’s (1983) work on expected probabilities of achieving particular compositional fertility 
goals in the absence of pre-selection to test whether the observed compositional (based on 
gender) distribution at each parity is different from the expected distribution, and whether 
these differences have changed over time. I use the binomial test to check for statistical 
significance of the differences between observed and expected. The binomial test is appropriate 
with small samples where approximations of continuous distribution breakdown. Differences in 
the expected and observed proportions could be a result of either sex-selective stopping 
behavior or sex-selective abortions, or both; I measure these responses next. 
I calculate sex ratios at birth by education, rural-urban residence, household wealth 
status, and birth parity for all births in the five years previous to the survey for both time 
periods.5 These differentials help highlight the prevalence of sex ratio imbalances in groups 
most at risk of practicing prenatal sex-selection, as shown in previous studies on countries with 
high sex ratios (Guilmoto 2007; Filmer, Friedman, and Schady 2009). Comparing the sex ratios 
across the two survey rounds helps determine whether sex ratios are increasing or not, thereby 
offering evidence for, or against the use of sex-selective abortion. 
 
                                                
4In the initial analyses, I made use of the slight dependency for the sex of the next birth to be like that of 
prior births (i.e., P
s
= 51.45+ 0.3N
s
 - 0.5N
d
, where P
s 
= percent sons; N
s 
= number of prior sons; N
d
=number of 
prior daughters, see Bongaarts and Potter 1983: 204). However, because the probabilities under the 
assumption of independence lead to more conservative estimate of preferential treatment than those 
under the assumption of slight dependency, we only present the results for the former. 
 
5Similar to other studies (Guilmoto 2007; 2009), I limit the calculation to births five years before the 
survey to capture more recent trends in sex-selection. 
12 
 
Estimating the SRB can be difficult due to this statistical indicator’s sensitivity to sample 
size (Guilmoto 2009). The SRB needs to be calculated using a large number of births to avoid 
fluctuations within large confidence intervals. A sex ratio of 106 calculated using survey data 
with a sample of 10,000 has a 95 percent confidence interval of 102–110 (Arnold, Kishor, and 
Roy 2002). The confidence intervals for a normal sex ratio of 106, given the sample size, are 
calculated for each subsample to check whether the estimated SRB is outside this range. I also 
used the alternative approach – the one-tailed binomial test – for testing whether the calculated 
sex ratios at births are significantly different from 106. Even though my hypotheses are 
directional in nature (more boys than girls, i.e. higher than normal SRBs) and thus subject to 
one-tailed tests, only confidence intervals are presented in this paper because they offer a more 
conservative estimate of significance. Additionally, chi-square tests are applied to test whether 
the elevated SRBs were statistically different from other SRBs across different parities.  
The second part of the analysis focuses on measuring differential stopping. I look at 
how the gender composition of previous children influences the probability of continuing 
childbearing (parity progression ratios) as well as the probability of using contraception. 
Alongside this, I include a more prospective approach similar to that of Pollard and Morgan 
(2002) for analyzing the link between son-preference and fertility outcomes by studying fertility 
intentions.  
Logistic regression models are used to statistically test the effect of sex composition of 
previous siblings/children on fertility behavior (progression and contraceptive use) and 
intentions of currently married women. Logistic regression models control for background 
characteristics including place of residence, women’s educational attainment, household wealth 
status, age, etc. In order to test whether the effect of son preference has changed between the 
two time points, I pool the data and use an interaction term for year and sex composition of 
previous births. Similarly, in order to identify which demographic groups are more responsive 
to sex preference, interaction terms between gender composition and education and place of 
residence are also included in the models. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
6.1 Expected Probabilities 
I present some trends in the differences in expected versus actual distribution of women 
across different sex composition combinations as this measure indicates behavioral response—
in the form of differential stopping or sex-selective abortion—to son preference. The probability 
of a certain compositional goal can be calculated using the basic underlying probabilities of 
having a boy or a girl (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). Therefore, in a three-child family, the 
probability of having three sons would be 0.136 in the absence of sex preference. If there were 
no sex preferential behaviors occurring in Pakistan, the proportion of women having three boys 
would not be statistically different from this proportion. 
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Table 1: Probability of achieving compositional fertility goals and 
the actual proportions of various compositions at each parity over 
time 
 Expected 
1 Actual 1991 Actual 2007 
Parity one 
Boy 0.515 0.512 0.538** 
Girl 0.485 0.488 0.462** 
Parity two 
2 boys 0.265 0.267 0.288** 
1 boy, 1 girl 0.500 0.510 0.495 
2 girls 0.236 0.223 0.217** 
Parity three 
3 boys 0.136 0.131 0.158*** 
2 boys, 1 girl 0.386 0.417** 0.421*** 
2 girls, 1 boy 0.364 0.333** 0.330*** 
3 girls 0.114 0.119 0.090*** 
Parity four 
4 boys 0.070 0.059* 0.074 
3 boys, 1 girl 0.265 0.264 0.278 
2 boys, 2 girls 0.374 0.388 0.405*** 
3 girls, 1 boy 0.235 0.237 0.198*** 
4 girls 0.056 0.052 0.045** 
1 Assuming the probability of a boy is 0.5145 and independent of gender 
composition of previous births.  
Table 1 shows the proportions of women with specific gender compositions across 
parities one to four over time. We find that while most of the observed proportions were not 
statistically different from the expected probabilities in 1991, the situation changes 
dramatically in 2007. In the later time period, the proportion of women having all, or a majority 
of daughters within each family size is significantly lower than would be expected, given the 
fixed probabilities of having a girl or a boy6. The differences between expected and observed 
proportions is highest at parity three and parity 4 four. The proportion of women with three 
children who have only daughters is expected to be 0.114; in 1991, the observed proportion is 
0.119, very close to the proportion (and not statistically different). However, by 2007, this 
proportion has decreased to 0.09. The difference is even more pronounced for women who 
                                                
6See footnote 4. 
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have two girls and one boy – 0.330 compared to the expected 0.366. For women with four 
children, once again, there are fewer women with a majority of girls (three or more) than 
expected in 2007. These differences can be seen more clearly in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Difference between expected and observed distribution gender 
composition by parity 
 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01 
While the disproportionate small proportion of families with no or one son point 
towards some sort of sex preferential behavior, it does not tell us whether this is a result of 
differential stopping behavior or sex selective abortion. For example, it may be that couples 
with no sons go on to the next parity while those two sons stop. This would lead a fewer two 
daughter families and more two son families among two children families. I present evidence 
on both responses in the following sections.  
6.2 Evidence of Sex Selection 
Table 2 shows that the SRB for the five years preceding the survey increased from 101 in 
1991 to 110 in 2007. The shift from normal to elevated SRB corresponds to the timing of the 
decline in fertility rates – as noted in the introduction, fertility decline in Pakistan began in the 
early 1990s and had declined dramatically by 2007. It should be noted that I find no clear 
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evidence of elevated sex ratios for any sub-population (e.g., by region, parity, or education) in 
1991. Even though most of the elevated SRBs in 2007 are not significant due to small Ns, the 
uniform increase is consistent with the emergence of sex-selective abortion.  
Table 2: Sex ratios at births for women in the five years prior to the survey, by 
background characteristics 
 1991  2007 
n SRB 95% CI for 106 n SRB 95% CI for 106 
Overall  6,426 101 100.9 111.3 9,112 110 101.7 110.4 
Region 
Urban 
 
3,373 100 99.1 113.4 3,116 115** 98.8 113.7 
Rural 
 
3,053 104 98.7 113.8  5,996 108 100.7 111.5 
Mother’s 
education 
None 
 
4,878 102 100.2 112.1 6,178 112** 100.8 111.4 
Primary 
1–5 
 
634 95 90.7 123.9  1,224 102 94.7 118.6 
Secondary 
6–10 
 
828 104 92.5 121.5  1,163 104 94.5 118.9 
Higher 
10+ 
 
86 (-) 69.2 163.2  547 118 89.6 125.4 
Birth 
order 
1 1,126 115 94.3 119.2 1,880 108 96.8 116.0 
2 1,021 106 93.7 119.9  1,673 110 96.3 116.7 
3 944 99 93.3 120.5  1,397 125** 95.4 117.7 
4 817 94 92.4 121.6  1,165 113 94.5 118.9 
5+ 2,518 97 98.0 114.6  2,997 105 98.7 113.9 
CI = confidence interval 
Assuming independence p (boy) = 0.5145 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05 à 106 significantly different from SRB 
One would expect that the sex ratio would increase first in urban areas given that 
women in these areas desire fewer children and have relatively greater access to facilities 
providing prenatal screening and abortion services (Guilmoto 2007; Filmer et al. 2009). The 
analysis of the demographic and health survey data supports this hypothesis. Over time, the 
SRB has increased significantly in urban areas, rising from 100 in 1991 to 115 for the 2002–06 
birth cohorts. The analysis of sex ratios by women’s educational attainment shows higher sex 
ratios in the latter round for women at both ends of the spectrum – no education and higher 
education. While the SRB of 112 for women with no education is significantly different from 
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106, the SRB of 118 for women with higher education is not. This is due to the smaller sample 
size of the higher education group.  
Looking at sex ratio by birth-order provides stronger evidence of sex-selection in 
Pakistan. While sex ratios have remained largely unchanged for lower parities (one or two) and 
high parities (five or more), sex ratios have increased substantially at third and fourth births, 
coinciding with the reported ideal number of children. Even with a sample size of less than 
1,400 births, a SRB of 125 at third births is significantly higher than normal levels. And 
although the SRB of 113 at parity four in 2007 is not statistically different from 106, it is 
substantially larger than the SRB of 94 in 1991.  
In Table 3, I calculate SRB by birth-order and the number of previous sons. These 
calculations allow us to look for evidence of elevated sex ratios where one would most expect 
to find them – among those with several children but no sons. The estimates in Table 3 confirm 
our suspicion in the 2006–07 data. The sex ratio is significantly different from 106 and highest 
(134) for those with three children but no previous sons. Depending on how significance is 
calculated, SRBs are significantly elevated at parity two and three births with one previous son7. 
This again hints at a preference for two boys among Pakistani couples. A chi-square statistic of 
12.4 indicates that the SRB of 134 is also significantly different from the sex ratio for all other 
parities combined.   
                                                
7Had I assumed that the probability of a male birth was dependent on sex of previous births, the elevated 
SRBs would have been even more significant. I do not present those confidence intervals and binomial 
tests results and follow the more conservative estimates of significance. 
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Table 3: Sex ratios at births in the five years prior to the survey, 
by number of previous siblings that are boys (2007) 
 Birth order n SRB 95% CI for 106 
No previous sons 
1 1,880 108 96.8 116.0 
2 810 100 92.3 121.7 
3 346 134** 85.8 131.0 
4+ 230 98 81.8 137.6 
1 previous son 
2 863 119 92.7 121.2 
3 662 121 91.0 123.5 
4+ 878 117 92.8 121.0 
2 or more previous sons 
3 389 125 86.9 129.4 
4+ 3,054 105 92.7 121.2 
Assuming independence p (boy)=0.5145 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05à 106 significantly different from SRB 
Estimating the number of sex-selective abortions taking place is a relatively simple task 
given the total number of births, normal SRB, and observed SRB (Kulkarni 2007). The number of 
sex-selective abortions is equal to the difference between the expected number of female births 
and actual number of female births, where the expected number of female births is just the 
normal SRB multiplied by the number of expected male births (expected male births and actual 
male birth are equal, assuming no male sex-selective abortions). Actual male births can be 
calculated using the observed SRB. Assuming an observed sex ratio of 110, if 1,000 women give 
birth, 524 of these births will be male and 476 female births. The expected number of female 
births with 524 male births under a normal SRB of 106 would be 494. This implies that there 18 
missing females/sex-selective abortions per 1,000 births. With an SRB of 134, the estimated 
number of sex-selective abortions per 1,000 births would increase to 113.  
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Table 4: Calculation for number of sex-selective abortions for 
different levels of sex ratios at birth 
SRB 110 115 120 125 134 
LB 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
MB = LB*SRB/(100 + SRB) 524 535 545 556 573 
FB = LB - MB 476 465 455 444 427 
EFB = MB*100/106 494 505 515 524 540 
SSA = EFB - FB 18 39 60 80 113 
Abortions proportion 1.80% 3.9% 6.0% 8.0% 11.3% 
SRB = Sex ratio at birth; LB = live births; MB = male births; FB = female 
births; EFB = Expected female births; SSA = sex-selective abortions 
6.3 Evidence of Stopping Behavior 
6.3.1 Parity progression 
In order to assess the level of stopping behavior I turn to an analysis of parity 
progression ratios. I limit my sample to women who have had no birth in the last five years so 
that the progression ratios reflect fertility behavior of women who have likely completed their 
desired family8.  
The differences in parity progression ratios by sex composition of previous births for 
the two time periods are presented in Table 5. Three interesting patterns emerge from this 
table. First, progression ratios among women with all or majority daughters are higher than for 
those with all or majority sons. In 1991, the ratio of moving from parity two to parity three was 
.894 for women with only boys and .903 for those with only girls (a ratio of 1.01), these ratios 
changed to .890 and .917 in 2007 (1.03 ratio).  
  
                                                
8Analysis is limited to women with no births in the last five years in order to capture women who have 
completed finished childbearing. In the 2007 sample, only 15 percent of women with no birth in the last 
five years intended to have another child.  
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Table 5: Parity progression ratios for currently married women with 
no birth in the last five years, by parity and gender composition of 
previous children 
 1991 2007 
p1 to p2 
Boy 0.931 0.939 
Girl 0.907 0.940 
Total 0.919 0.940 
p2 to p3 
2 boys 0.894 0.890 
1 boy, 1 girl 0.876 0.882 
2 girls 0.903 0.917 
Total 0.887 0.892 
p3 to p4 
3 boys 0.855 0.803 
2 boys, 1 girl 0.787 0.797 
2 girls, 1 boy 0.847 0.852 
3 girls 0.863 0.905 
Total 0.828 0.828 
p4 to p5 
4 boys 0.816 0.754 
3 boys, 1 girl 0.783 0.717 
2 boys, 2 girls 0.744 0.744 
3 girls, 1 boy 0.765 0.824 
4 girls 0.800 0.848 
Total 0.769 0.762 
 
This brings us to the second interesting pattern; differences in parity progression by 
gender composition have become more acute over the two time periods. While the difference 
was less than 0.009 in 1991, it increased to 0.023 in 2007. The increase in son preference over 
time is seen in progression from three to four children even more starkly; in 1991, the 
difference between progression ratios for three girls and three boys was 0.008 (0.863–0.855). 
This increased to 0.102 (0.905–0.803) in 2007. Thirdly, there is some evidence of a preference 
for a few boys and at least one daughter – progression ratios from parity three to four are lower 
for those women two boys and one girl in both time periods. This mixed preference is observed 
for progression ratios from p2 to p3, and p4 to p5, as well. 
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The results for the logistic regression analysis in Table 6 (model 1s) show that women 
who have majority girls (2–3 girls at parity three; and 3–4 girls at parity four) are more likely to 
progress to the next birth by 30 percent and 44 percent, respectively, even when controlling for 
background characteristics. Although in the right direction, the result is not significant when 
progressing from two to three births. The results also demonstrate that the decrease in family 
size across all parities also persists after controlling for other characteristics. 
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Table 6: Odds ratios for progressing to next birth 
 Progression to 3rd birth 
 
Progression to 
4th birth 
 
Progression to 5th 
birth 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Sex 
preference 
Majority 
boys 
 
(Ref) (Ref) (Ref) (Ref) (Ref) (Ref) 
Majority 
girls 
 
0.939 0.910 
 
1.299*** 1.162*  1.439*** 1.164 
Survey 
year 
1991 (Ref)   (Ref) (Ref)  (Ref) (Ref) 
2007 0.749*** 0.730***  0.870*** 0.798***  0.819*** 0.741*** 
Majority 
girls × 
survey year  
Majority 
boys × 
2007 
 
  
 
 (Ref)   (Ref) 
Majority 
girls × 
2007 
 
 1.052 
 
 1.208*   1.433*** 
Educational 
attainment 
None (Ref) (Ref)  (Ref) (Ref)  (Ref) (Ref) 
Primary 0.806*** 0.806***  0.848** 0.848**  0.900 0.897 
Secondary 0.628*** 0.627***  0.647*** 0.644***  0.561*** 0.558*** 
High 0.269*** 0.269***  0.182*** 0.182***  0.211*** 0.209*** 
Place of 
residence 
Rural (Ref)   (Ref) (Ref)  (Ref) (Ref) 
Urban 1.195*** 1.195***  1.073 1.074  1.140* 1.142* 
Household 
Wealth 
Index 
Poorest (Ref) (Ref)  (Ref) (Ref)  (Ref) (Ref) 
Second 1.036 1.035  1.063 1.063  0.977 0.975 
Third 1.222** 1.223  1.114 1.115  0.930 0.925 
Fourth 1.040 1.040  1.013 1.015  0.835* 0.833* 
Richest 0.930 0.930  0.819* 0.822*  0.661*** 0.661*** 
Respondent’s age 1.184*** 1.184***  1.134*** 1.134***  1.123*** 1.123*** 
Constant 0.029*** 0.029***  0.051*** 0.053***  0.049*** 0.0526*** 
Observations 12,247 12,247  10,027 10,027  7,750 7,750 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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I ran models that tested for interaction between having majority girls (measure of son 
preference) and year, respondents’ education and place of residence. However, there was no 
significant interaction between number of previous sons and respondent’s education or place of 
residence – the effect of gender composition of previous children did not differ for urban and 
rural residents or for women with varying education levels. But the effect of son preference on 
progression to next birth is higher in 2007 than 1991 when progressing from three to four 
births (at the 90 percent significance level only) and four to five births (model 2s in Table 6).  
6.3.2 Current use 
If women are using sex preferential stopping behavior to achieve their desired 
compositional goals then there should be differentials in contraceptive use by sex composition 
of previous births. Table 7 shows current use of contraception by gender composition of 
previous births for 1991 and 2007. The differentials are as expected; contraceptive use is higher 
for women with all or majority sons than for women with all or majority daughters. While 
contraceptive use rates increase substantially over time, the differentials in use are strong for 
both years. Once again, there is evidence of a slight preference for boys with at least one 
daughter – contraceptive prevalence is highest for women with one boy and one girl among two 
children families, two boys and one girl among three children families, and three boys and one 
girl among four children families. 
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Table 7: Current Use of contraception, by 
gender composition of children 
 
1991 2007 
% N % N 
One child 
Boy 3.6 421 14.0 663 
Girl 6.2 406 12.0 573 
Total 4.8 827 13.1 1,236 
Two children 
2 boys 8.5 211 27.2 386 
1 boy, 1 girl 12.8 406 27.4 676 
2 girls 7.3 178 19.1 298 
Total 10.4 795 25.5 1,360 
Three children 
3 boys 15.0 120 36.1 202 
2 boys, 1 girl 20.1 369 36.7 556 
2 girls, 1 boy 11.3 301 32.2 422 
3 girls 12.8 109 25.9 116 
Total 15.6 899 34.2 1,296 
Four children 
4 boys 22.0 50 39.1 92 
3 boys, 1 girl 21.7 221 47.2 339 
2 boys, 2 girls 18.5 330 44.9 497 
3 girls, 1 boy 17.0 200 31.2 250 
4 girls 14.0 43 39.7 58 
Total 19 844 42.1 1,236 
 
The results of the logistic regression analysis in Table 8 show that this differential 
stopping behavior persists even when controlling for other characteristics. Model 1 shows that 
the odds of using contraception with only one son or two or more sons are 1.28 (e0.249) and 1.87 
(e0.628) times the odds with no sons, when controlling for year, parity, place of residence, 
woman’s educational attainment and age, and household wealth status.   
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Table 8: Logistic regression coefficients for current use of contraception 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 
Number of sons 
0 sons (Ref) (Ref) 
1 son 0.249*** 0.0987 
 (0.0889) (0.164) 
2+ sons 0.628*** 0.368** 
 (0.0926) (0.152) 
Survey year 
1991 (Ref) (Ref) 
2007 1.158*** 0.853*** 
 (0.0495) (0.163) 
No. of sons × survey 
year  
0 sons × 2007  (ref) 
1 son × 2007  0.211 
  (0.192) 
2+ sons × 2007  0.368** 
  (0.172) 
Total number of 
children 
One (Ref) (Ref) 
Two 0.667*** 0.660*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) 
Three 1.045*** 1.032*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) 
Four 1.426*** 1.415*** 
 (0.110) (0.109) 
Five 1.504*** 1.496*** 
 (0.112) (0.111) 
Educational 
attainment 
None (Ref) (Ref) 
Primary 0.453*** 0.456*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0660) 
Secondary 0.736*** 0.739*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0684) 
High 0.936*** 0.946*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) 
Place of residence 
Rural (Ref) (Ref) 
Urban 0.274*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0524) 
Household Wealth 
Index 
Poorest (Ref) (Ref) 
Second 0.521*** 0.523*** 
 (0.0847) (0.0848) 
Third 0.834*** 0.838*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0835) 
Fourth 1.205*** 1.208*** 
 (0.0855) (0.0856) 
Richest 1.564*** 1.567*** 
 (0.0942) (0.0943) 
Respondent’s age  -0.00650* -0.00667**  (0.00338) (0.00338) 
Constant  -4.496*** -4.268***  (0.146) (0.183) 
Observations 13,836 13,836 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Similar to progression results, I found an interaction effect between number of previous 
sons and year (model 2, Table 8): even though women in 2007 were more likely to be using 
contraception than those in 1991 (e0.853 = odds ratio of 2.3), the effect of having sons (versus 
having no sons) on the odds of contraceptive use was greater in 2007. These results are in the 
expected direction – as family size gets smaller, the preference for sons becomes harder to 
realize and there is greater pressure for preferential behavior.  
6.3.3 Intentions 
Another way to measure stopping behavior is to look at differentials in intention to stop 
childbearing, i.e., have no more children. Table 9 shows that women with only daughters are 
less likely to report the intention to have another child in the future than if they have one or 
more sons. Once again, there is a preference for at least one girl along with one or more boys – 
the intention to have no more children is highest for women at that gender composition of 
children. This preference is unchanging over time.   
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Table 9: Intention to have no more children, by gender composition 
of previous children 
 
1991 2007 
% N % N 
One child 
Boy 6.7 405 10.7 653 
Girl 6.1 395 4.9 566 
Total 6.4 800 8.0 1,219 
Two children 
2 boys 23.3 206 33.2 376 
1 boy, 1 girl 25.6 383 36.7 660 
2 girls 8.3 168 12.2 287 
Total 21.1 757 30.4 1,323 
Three children 
3 boys 38.8 116 58.6 198 
2 boys, 1 girl 47.0 349 66.6 539 
2 girls, 1 boy 29.6 294 47.1 414 
3 girls 21.1 104 18.3 115 
Total 36.8 863 54.6 1,266 
Four children 
4 boys 57.1 49 65.2 89 
3 boys, 1 girl 59.5 215 84.1 333 
2 boys, 2 girls 57.5 320 82.6 483 
3 girls, 1 boy 43.7 192 63.5 241 
4 girls 15.0 40 28.6 56 
Total 52.7 816 75.4 1,202 
 
This table also demonstrates the overall decrease in desired family size – at all parity 
levels in 2007, a larger proportion of women intend to stop childbearing than their 
counterparts did in 1991. However, the difference in intention over time is less pronounced for 
women with only daughters. For example, 37 percent of women with three children in 1991 
intended to have no more children, this proportion increased by almost 20 percentage points to 
55 percent for women in 2007. Yet, the percent of women with three daughters intending to 
stop childbearing actually decreased by three percentage points from 1991 to 2007 – from 21 
percent to 18 percent.   
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Table 10: Logistic regression coefficients for intention to stop 
(have no more) childbearing 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 
Number of sons 
0 sons (Ref) (Ref) 
1 son 1.166*** 1.278*** 
 (0.0962) (0.153) 
2+ sons 1.846*** 1.278*** 
 (0.0973) (0.146) 
Survey year 
1991 (Ref) (Ref) 
2007 0.887*** 0.134 
 (0.0485) (0.175) 
No. of sons × survey year  
0 sons × 2007  (Ref) 
1 son × 2007  0.530*** 
  (0.195) 
2+ sons × 2007  0.920*** 
  (0.184) 
Total number of children 
One (Ref) (Ref) 
Two 1.003*** 0.979*** 
 (0.108) (0.108) 
Three 1.547*** 1.506*** 
 (0.109) (0.109) 
Four 2.154*** 2.119*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) 
Five 2.564*** 2.541*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) 
Educational attainment 
None (Ref) (Ref) 
Primary 0.322*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0770) 
Secondary 0.593*** 0.604*** 
 (0.0822) (0.0822) 
High 0.232* 0.262** 
 (0.120) (0.121) 
Place of residence 
Rural (Ref) (Ref) 
Urban 0.191*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0574) 
Household Wealth Index 
Poorest (Ref) (Ref) 
Second 0.291*** 0.298*** 
 (0.0721) (0.0724) 
Third 0.409*** 0.416*** 
 (0.0750) (0.0753) 
Fourth 0.748*** 0.753*** 
 (0.0821) (0.0824) 
Richest 0.918*** 0.921*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0963) 
Respondent’s age  0.0853*** 0.0855***  (0.00365) (0.00365) 
Constant  -7.023*** -6.524***  (0.172) (0.198) 
Observations 13,381 13,381 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 10 shows the multivariate logistic regression results for intention to continue 
childbearing. In the additive model (model 1), the odds of intending to have no more births if a 
woman has two sons are more than six times the odds (e1.85) if she has two or more sons, when 
controlling for parity and other background characteristics. Even if a woman has one son, the 
odds of intending to stop childbearing are three times higher (e1.17) than if she had more sons. 
Similar to contraceptive use, there were no significant interactions between number of previous 
sons and urban-rural residence or education level for intention to stop childbearing, thus those 
models are not included in the paper. But once again, the differentials in intention to stop by 
number of previous sons have increased between the two survey rounds. The coefficients for 
the interaction term between year and number of previous sons are positive and highly 
significant for both no son and one son. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
Son preference serves as an indirect measure of gender discrimination in a society. 
When fertility falls son preference is more visible and becomes a useful indicator of gender 
discrimination as well as an important factor affecting contraceptive uptake, fertility levels, and 
thereby sex ratios. The findings of this paper indicate that in Pakistan evidence of gender 
discrimination is unmistakable and is playing an increasingly important role in fertility 
behavior and in altering sex ratios.  
Overall, the analysis presented provides strong evidence that women are using selective 
stopping behavior to achieve their desired compositional goals. Pakistani women are more 
likely to intend to go on to have another child and/or be a non-user of contraception if they do 
not have the desired number of sons (one or two). Moreover, the abnormally high SRB for those 
with no or one son (shown in Table 3) is as Bongaarts says “unambiguous evidence” of sex 
selective abortion taking place. An abnormal SRB of 110 implies that of the 140 abortions for 
every 1,000 pregnancies that take place in Pakistan (Vlassoff et al. 2009), 13 percent are sex-
selective abortions to achieve desired gender composition (see Table 4 for calculation of the 
number of sex-selective abortions).  
This evidence holds strong implications for future challenges facing Pakistan’s 
population. If imbalances in sex ratios at birth are reflective of reality and are left unaddressed, 
they may rise to the levels in neighboring India, and Pakistan will face even greater social, 
economic, and political challenges than it presently does. On the other hand, continued reliance 
on differential stopping to achieve desired number of sons will also have direct and indirect 
consequences for society. On a more immediate level, continuing childbearing differentially will 
slow down fertility decline, impeding reductions in population growth and exacerbating the 
already acute problems of insufficient public services, including energy, water, and schooling.
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Moreover, differential stopping will intensify gender inequality because girls will belong to 
larger households disproportionately because families with girls are the ones that continue 
childbearing until a son is born. The reduction in resources available to each child in larger 
families will thus affect girls more. 
The results of this paper are relevant not only for Pakistan’s future but also for other 
patriarchal societies, especially those currently experiencing fertility declines. The strong 
evidence of skewed sex ratios at birth suggests that lack of legal and safe abortion services are 
not sufficient in protecting against the practice of sex-selective abortions. Patriarchal 
institutions and pressures favoring sons seem to outweigh the health risks and social/religious 
stigma of seeking abortion for women resorting to this practice. Finally, demographers need to 
rethink their blind advocacy for low fertility rates (arguably only to replacement levels) without 
paying attention to unintended negative consequences of the fertility transition. The below 
replacement fertility crisis faced by several industrialized countries should have taught us the 
importance of accounting for context and culture in our prescriptions for reaching that elusive 
happy equilibrium. The skewed sex ratios being experienced by an increasing number of 
developing countries is the very same lecture, just in different packaging.  
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